Globalization entails a world of flows and crumbling social identities. If we want to get a clear look at the human basis of these seemingly superhuman processes, it is indispensable to investigate the impacts of globalization on specific lifeworlds. Unfortunately, the anthropology of globalization is still in its infancy, notably concerning urban elites outside the West.

This article presents an ethnography of how the youth of the rich elites in the South-Indian metropole Bangalore experience and produce globalization while going out. As a Third World metropole, Bangalore bears the traces of colonialism, laborious modernization, migrations, multiculturalism and transnational commodity traffic: the essential aspects of globalization. Bangalore is also interesting because Indian politics has recently altered course in favour of liberalization, as elsewhere in Asia, bringing new socio-cultural tensions to the surface.

In spite of the social, cultural, political and even economic significance of going out (in the broadest sense), cultural studies has paid little attention to the various facets of going out - music, dance, mobility, counterhegemony, sexuality, looking and being looked at, etiquette, drugs, escapism, and spaces which are outlined as subcultural places. A great number of meanings, feelings and practices is organized through/around pop music, and I will therefore empirically focus on this aspect of youth culture. Soon it will be evident that I regard the spatial axis of youth culture to be determining (cf. Malbon 277-280).

In fact, the cultural geography which follows could also be called sociology of music. Music is something eccentric in media studies, plausibly because it’s tough to get a semiotic grip on due to its evocative and non-denotative nature. It seems better, then, to regard music, like Simon Frith does, as a cultural practice, an intersubjective and meaningful process.

Bangalore, global city

Anthony King (120-121) doesn’t consider "modernity", "postmodernity" and "globalization" to be simply Western export products. Perhaps, colonial cities were "postmodern" and "global" earlier than cities in Europe, precisely because of interdependency, ethnocentrism, multi-ethnicity, and friction between tradition and modernity. More psychologically, colonialism produced in the Third World the sedimentation of a kind of inferiority complex, a feeling that the West is "ahead" and the non-West is "behind". On the other hand, the same colonization gave rise to many postcolonial nation-states and anti-Western nationalisms (Nandy). James Carrier (6) correctly remarks that there has been far too little theorising and study of occidentalization, the stereotypic depiction of the West, especially in the non-West.

The public sphere of India is a striking illustration of the resulting discursive mishmash. Leninism and neo-
liberalism, nationalism, regionalism and separatism, fundamentalism and spiritualism, authoritarianism and pluralism, populism and elitism, and the New Left too: India is pinched uncomfortably between all these isms. The political reactions to the liberalization policy that the government has implemented since 1992 covers this entire spectrum, but for the rich and young consumer it means that he/she can finally indulge in multinational freedom of choice. Young people then think about those things that are closest to them: clothing brands, fastfood, hi-tech, places for going out, and media products, pre-eminently pop music.

Thanks to its booming software industry, Bangalore is baptized the Silicon Valley of India. A postindustrial India is appearing on the horizon. For everyone who wants to (and who can) go forward, all that reeks of the former primness and shabbiness, is categorically undesirable.

The Western pop music scene in the Bangalore of the 1990s has to be seen in the light of this neo-liberal optimism. However, supply of audio cassettes has hardly changed since liberalization commenced, while the CD market is still black. It’s still a few big licence companies who, as powerful gatekeepers, decide what foreign popular music comes in and what doesn't. And their selectivity is not very logical. You can buy most hitlist pop in India, and hardrockers get their share too, but successful bands such as The Smiths, The Police or The Cure are very hard to find.

Nevertheless, the musical landscape of India has been transformed drastically by the coming of StarTV, the 24-hour-satellite network of Asia. Star exemplifies, in the audiovisual domain, the sudden keeness with which multinationals turn to Asia’s gigantic consumer market. MTV Asia was in the original Star package, but moved over to the broadcasting system of State channel Doordarshan in 1994. StarTV reacted with StarMusic, later Channel [V] (Ninan 172-174). MTV Asia (now de facto MTV India) and Channel [V] didn’t only mean the first acquaintance of the Indian public with postmodernist television (and all the concurrent moral panic). They also meant an enormous expansion of subcultural knowledge amongst young people (Ninan 149-150). Music of course, but also in the syntax of the music video, ads, fashion, film, dance; the visual bricolage, the pastiche, the sensuality.

Naturally, developments in India’s own production of technology have contributed to the consolidation of global musical taste, as witnessed by the joint ventures with Japanese hardware companies and recently with the coming of Sony and Daewood. The pubs in Bangalore are mushrooming, following the dialogue of supply and demand. Like these pubs, the two dance clubs of Bangalore conveniently turn the MTV-literacy of the global youth into profit. And the increase in physical and social mobility of these youngsters, made possible by more lenient parents and flashy scooters, entailed a frequenting of these subcultural places. Meanwhile, the informal circuit of recording one’s own music, giving private parties, exchanging popzines and video cassettes, hanging up posters, playing rock with friends and strolling in the new Muzak malls of Bangalore consolidate the intertextual web and the subcultural pleasures that the globalizing youth experience in their reception of Western pop music.

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**Subculture inside the car**

... a speculative experience of the world: being outside of these things that stay there, detached and absolute, that leave us without having anything to do with this departure themselves; being deprived of them, surprised by their ephemeral and quiet strangeness. ... One has to get out: there are only lost paradises. ... History begins again feverishly. ... There comes to an end the Robinson Crusoe adventure of the travelling noble soul that could believe itself intact because it was surrounded by glass and iron.

(de Certeau 111-114)

The experience of sitting in motorised transport is unique and thoroughly modern. The world outside passes like a movie, what counts is just the illusion of separation, cursory immunity. The greater the distinction between the comfort of inside and the tumult of outside, the more pleasurable the movement of the passenger.

Obviously, the passenger is only a veritable flâneur if the journey becomes a goal in itself. For urban youth, riding around without clear destination is a practice embedded with much subcultural meaning. The car is fetishized, specially by boys, who integrate the technics and aesthetics of the product into their sexual culture. By driving away from parents and school, the car provides the possibility of creating your own space and time.
Music is central in this respect. Music which you can play louder than at home, music which you’d like your friends to hear, music without which driving around wouldn’t be half as much fun. In the car, you can smoke and drink, and make out. For the wealthy youth of Bangalore, these "joyrides" form a very urban, very modern, very global matter.

"[Machines] are brought down to earth (‘mediatised’) by being made to function as differential elements - as markers of identity and difference - organised into meaningful relations through their location within cultural/ideological codes", writes Dick Hebdige (86-87). In Indian cities, motorised transport symbolizes strong classifications of social groups. For example, the Honda Kinetic scooter appears to be the exclusive "property" of rich girls and working women. The Indian-made Bajaj scooter, on the contrary, is invariably connotated with the old-fashioned, dull middleclass male. For years the number of car models available was limited to four or five. Now, every launching of a new brand in motor vehicles means, for those who can pay, that they can finally enter the prosperity, mobility and comfort which they coveted through Western media texts, but couldn’t buy. The Ambassador, that mammoth of Indian stagnation, that apex of statist distaste and inefficiency, has become a curiosity.

So the formal and industrial origin of cars in 1990s India is in itself a powerful socio-cultural referent. But the practical consumption of vehicles by rich youth stresses even more what Pierre Bourdieu calls "dinstinction". Only rich youth have enough time and money to enjoy driving around - petrol is relatively costly. Only rich youth can afford a bribe when any problems should arise with the cops. Only rich youth give a cultural meaning to these rides through what they do inside the car: playing Western pop, gossiping, flirting, preparing themselves for the evening out. They don’t just "go somewhere".

As soon as boys get their driving license at 18 (and even before that, as in India you needn’t be too particular about these things), driving fast becomes an indisputable part of their machismo. Now Indians aren’t really known for their disciplined driving behaviour, but young men turn fast driving into a sport, especially on two-wheelers. Anyone who has knowledge of the extreme hotch-potch on the Indian streets, knows that this could easily mean suicide. Undoubtedly, the music playing in cars adds to the excitement, above all when it’s loud techno. And then there’s the booze too (in India no "don’t drink and drive" as yet). Evidently, the rich youth of Bangalore get a lot of kicks from driving around. They redefine the entire city as their amusement park.

But the sights of the town barely raise their interest. The city is rendered abstract through the air-conditioning, tainted and closed windows, high speeds, loud music and the animated conversations within. Outside, there’s noise, dust, stench, heat, mass, misery that can’t permeate through the "glass and iron". Girls in the car don’t have to fear the so detested gaze of poorer men. If a beggar or cow tries to get a glimpse of what’s going on inside, the feeling of ruling the road intensifies even more. The music is audible outside, but muffled.

You drive around in a cooled ivory tower. A solopsistic inside, which coheres by the realisation that because you’re there, you’re eluding something. Often, youth skip school, homework, tuition or family get-togethers to get in for a ride. And thus, the conspicuous consumption of the car creates a phenomenological detachment of everything that the old India stands for: poverty, chaos, ignorance (what’s that boom-boom-boom?), useless education, collectivism, sexual segregation, duty, sluggishness, the abscence of style.

Subculture in pubs and clubs

Bangalore is known in India as "pub city". There are about hundred pubs which specifically aim at a well-to-do and Westernised clientele. The owners of The Cellar, for example, have cleverly reacted to the enormous demand for leisure sites. On Saturday afternoon, the pub is the place-to-be for teenagers who aren’t allowed to go to discotheques at night. Particularly for girls from the more orthodox families, The Cellar is one of the few places where they can practice their global lifestyle together with peers. In The Cellar you can play your CDs, loud enough to dance on, and there are TVs switched on MTV. There are boys for which you don’t mind making yourself pretty, but the make-up must be removed before going home - some girls even have to change back into their school uniform. The spot lights create an atmosphere between cosy and disco, everybody drinks and most smoke (alhocol, cigarets and marihuana are no longer male privileges), there is air-co, bums don’t get passed the doorman, and you can’t notice anything of Brigade Rd. The only adults around are the waiters.
The chic of The Cellar is typical for Bangalore pubs. The Indian interpretation of Western spotlessness, elegance, trendiness and wealth is reified in everything from the names of the cocktails to the posters of pop and film stars. The house style is consistently tasteful in the eyes of the elites, but is in fact a selection of chic or pseudo-chic styles of the West. The Cellar illustrates exactly how globalization is coming about in Bangalore. Globalization and the development of youth culture are based on a peculiar interaction between demand (stimulated by intertextuality) and supply (offering space and time outside the parents’ and teachers’ control: niche marketing in its most literal sense); on the emergence of an equally cultural as consumerist youthful public sphere without sexual segregation; on the perceived homology between various elements in Western media culture and design; and on the filtering out of other elements - where’s grunge, bohemia, gays, scouts, new age, minimalism, dada? The globalness of The Cellar is as real as it is simulacral.

For the youth in Bangalore who are mobile enough, there are The Club and Concorde, two dance clubs lying outside the city limits to bypass the license system. The Club enjoys the most prestige of the two. Its prices are considerably high, even for yuppie standards, the setting is posh (a club in the British sense: hotel, restaurant, pool next to the dance tent), there are guest DJs, concerts and theme nights. Only couples are allowed in to avoid an overweight of boys, a door policy that is also followed at certain pubs and parties. Resident DJ Ivan takes care of the music, the light and sound equipment is solid, and the people are always in a festive mood.

Ivan is Bangalore’s favourite. He willy-nilly plays an important gatekeeping role for the popularity of dance music, but simultaneously has to keep into account what is aired on MTV and Channel [V] and what’s available in the music stores. Thus, he likes playing half an hour of techno and house (comparatively marginal genres in the stores), but too much beats without any lyrics would scare away a large part of the audience. Much of the pleasure attained in the social reception of music lies in the fact that the songs are known, so you can sing along (Killing Me Softly by The Fugees was obligatory during the autumn of 1996), you can imitate the music video (Macarena). In The Club, interaction between DJ and crowd and within the crowd is quintessential; individualizing techno and stroboscopes threaten this interaction.

Dancing is a non-linguistic reading of music, of non-representational text. If we dispose of the avant-gardist aura of Roland Barthes’ notion of jouissance, the concept is very useful in the examination of the pleasures popular culture provides (Fiske ch. 3). Jouissance is the hedonist’s escape from ideology, discipline, social identity. However, at the same time, the dancing subject produces and reproduces cultural cognition, ability, patterns, relations: subculture (Thornton; Malbon).

The global youth of Bangalore nearly always dance boy-girl, or in group. In any case, it’s always the girls who love dancing and drag the boys along. As Angela McRobbie has shown, dancing and dressing up are crucial for girls’ development of a sexual identity.

Girls show a different subcultural creativity than boys. If for boys the physicality in the active reception of music consists in the experimentation with legal and illegal drugs, girls seem more interested in dance and the cultural power dance can offer. However, the sensual movements of the girls in The Club aren’t explicitly meant to seduce the boys (cf. McRobbie 168-169), as the obtrusive gaze of men on the street is taboo inside subcultural space, and anyway girls mostly come with their boyfriends. In traditional India, there is no public space where girls can enjoy themselves and construct identities relatively separate from the hegemonic discourses which tell them how to handle their bodies. Indian girls recognize themselves in the girl-ness, the playful femininity of the imaginary girls in Western music videos. Girl power.

For girls who have shared the experience of fashion innovation; in style as a vehicle for self-expression, group identity and subversive pleasure; in the imaginative cultures of shopping malls and mediated texts as backdrops for fantasies and enactments of personal and social change, the female address videos of [Cyndi] Lauper and Madonna produce a field of gendered interpretations.

(Lewis 101)

"Postfeminist" dance culture seeps in, from the black ragga and hiphop of New York and London via MTV to The Club in Bangalore (see McRobbie 183-184).The dance of the girls becomes something political. With their short skirts and supple movement, they defy the puritan pedagogic patriarchy. Even if it were only in the space and time of the dance floor.
Subculture mid-day

The posttraditional creativity of the global youth in Bangalore is most apparent in the recent phenomenon of the so-called mid-day parties. To celebrate a birthday or some other occasion, up to 100,000 rupees is spent among a few extremely rich friends to put up a party in a four- or five-star hotel. Guests get in with invites and pay nothing for the music, drink and food. Mid-day parties (and private parties in general) are welcome supplements for the meagre supply of two nightclubs. The reason why mid-day parties are mid-day is that during the afternoon, it's far easier for teenagers (especially the girls) to think of fibs.

A last example of the spatial separation which accompanies the arising of global youth culture in India I witnessed at a mid-day party one afternoon in Whitefield, a colonial suburb of Bangalore. Resorts are being built everywhere around the metropole for the higher classes who want to flee from urban suffocation. This particular party was organised in the front yard of a well-kept country-house. As is often the case, no-one knew exactly who the party was for. Ivan was DJ-ing in the veranda, Smirnoff and Gordon's were available in the improvised bar (from the back of a Maruti jeep), the lawn served the purpose of dance floor. And the weather was wonderful.

Traditionally, dressing up in India is connected to religious ceremony. If boys and girls dress up to go out to pubs, clubs and parties, this has little to do with the formal, vernacular dress which they wear to please their parents. The outside party in Whitefield illustrated the growing right to self-decision of girls, how they should present themselves and what they may show of their body. Far less morality is expected from the boys. Indian girls are arguably less subject to discipline than les corps dociles of Michel Foucault (159-199), but puritan discourse still is incorporated in the way girls are conscious of their body.

That is why it's striking to see how a certain narcissism develops after the school uniform and the protectiveness/meddlesomeness of male family members become obsolete at the age of 18 to 20. Puritan discourse is incompatible with the discourses of youth culture and youthful leisure. Some boys enjoy exhibiting themselves too. Of course, T-shirts were removed from the broadest chests first, there in Whitefield. The pleasure of being looked at interacted with the pleasure of dancing. Sexy clothes are pretty pointless if you don't let yourself be admired from all sides while dancing.

And hence the comparison was made quite quickly between the Whitefield pool party and MTV programme The Grind, both by myself and by the participants. The Grind consists of a collection of scarcely dressed, suggestively dancing youths in a summer setting, who all try to attract the camera lens. Only, in Whitefield there wasn't any camera.

There were peepers, though. Over the surrounding walls, poor Indians, presumably workers of neighbouring farms, were watching the party bustle. An interesting, perverse form of exhibitionism/voyeurism comes into being. The global youth know very well that they are being watched, that these local others have probably never heard such loud pop music, never seen so much liquor and tight tops together before. They know that every three free-of-charge vodkas which they drink add up to the weekly salary of the peeping Toms behind the wall. But they feign an indifference for the fascination they produce amongst the lower classes, as they do when driving around in the inner city. They feign, because they are thoroughly aware of the visibility of their Western fashion, music, behaviour, their wealth. To a certain extent, this visibility is inevitable, especially in a modern city like Bangalore; on the other hand, provoking culture shock is fun. There was, in Whitefield, an ambivalent balance between exhibitionism and voyeurism; the poor devils could also have been rudely chased away.

Because of the coercive presence of local others, the youth knew they were still in Whitefield, Bangalore, India. Not in The Grind. Global youth constitutes, through/in the intertextual and corporeal reception of Western musics, an own subcultural space outside the local tradition of parents, school, work, poverty, bureaucracy, religion and puritanism. But simultaneously, they are fully conscious of the fact that everybody (every body) who turns his/her back to these cultural hegemonies, is prone to be looked at. Especially in the bright sunlight of Whitefield.

The politics of youth culture is a politics of metaphor: it deals with the currency of signs and is, thus, always ambiguous. For the subcultural ‘milieu’ has been constructed underneath the authorised discourses, in the face of the multiple disciplines of the family, the school and the workplace. Subculture forms up space between surveillance and the evasion of surveillance, it translates the fact of being under scrutiny into the pleasure of being watched. It is a hiding in the light.

(Hebdige 35)
The cultural geography of youth culture

Space is constructed socially. It follows that the spatial is an articulation of social demarcations, relations of power, meanings, myths, histories, and practices. If we acknowledge this humanness and complexity of space, a social geography that grounds itself merely on topography and statistics becomes inadequate. Mainly Marxist geographers are therefore seeking alignment with other disciplines: sociology of culture (Raymond Williams, Pierre Bourdieu), anthropology (Clifford Geertz), structuration theory (Anthony Giddens), semiotics (Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco) and poststructuralism (Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida). By giving a spatial twist to sociological concepts - modernity, capitalism, consumption, technology, class, gender, ethnicity, subculture - geographers such as David Harvey, Edward Soja and Doreen Massey have enhanced the "spatialization" of contemporary social and cultural theory.

From the level of the body to modern global process, the spatial is constituted through representation and imagination, through social interaction and individual experience. This is why space is also political; there is "struggle for place". This conception of spatiality is found particularly amongst philosophers like Henri Lefebvre and Michel de Certeau, who declaim against a rigid and monolithic portrayal of (urban) space by bringing everyday practice into their analysis.

We discover that urban ‘reality’ is not singular but multiple, that inside the city there is another city. ... The city is also a dirty sign, contaminated by different cultures, different forces, different desires, different needs that accumulate in the metropolitan body. And there is no guarantee that they are commensurable: there exists ‘a surplus of meaning’ (Laclau) (Chambers 183).

I think this varied approach to the construction of space through/in praxis and meaning is fruitful to investigate the life of modern youth in the city. Everywhere where modernization has made the cultural transmission of parents to children less self-evident, there is the creative development of a subcultural identity outside and against the pre-scribing discourses of family, tradition, workplace, nation-state and law. The modern city, multicultural space par excellence, intrinsically contains the possibility to evade these discourses: "L’urbain est ainsi, plus ou moins, l’œuvre des citadins au lieu de s’imposer à eux comme un système: comme un livre déjà terminé" (Lefebvre 73).

To speak about youth culture is, therefore, to speak about power and resistance. Antonio Gramsci’s cultural and dynamic concept of "hegemony" should prevent us from reducing power to a single axis of dominators/dominated. Power relations are reproduced and contested by both sides. Power is never pure, rational repression - power is lived, not programmed (see Bennett). Moreover, there are in fact different hegemonies, who manifest themselves in different societal domains, via different technologies, practices and codes. Foucault greatly encouraged the transition of a perspective which dealt solely with structural class domination to a more microsociological understanding of the local execution of power, "[t]echniques minutieuses toujours, souvent infimes, mais qui ont leur importance: puisqu’elles définissent un certain mode d’investissement politique et détaillé du corps, une nouvelle « microphysique » du pouvoir ... " (163).

The caprices of hegemony can only be fully recognised by turning to concrete appropriations and lifeworlds, in other words, to practice and the extra-textual (cf. McRobbie ch. 10). Even if ambivalence and contestation are demonstrated on the level of text/discourse/ representation, there can still be hegemonic closure in the reading (and vice versa of course). This is something certain scholars, John Fiske for instance, sometimes tend to forget. Nevertheless, Fiske’s original treatment of popular culture remains relevant to the study of youthful leisure practices. As he argues, the "productive consumption" of popular culture by young people is based on bodily pleasure, intertextuality, a certain "cultural capital" (see Bourdieu), and micropolitical strategies (see de Certeau) used to escape from the surveillance of the upbringing institutions.

These aspects are particularly evident in the cultural praxis of going out (cf. Thornton). No less for the modern youth in Bangalore. Only, the political-economical and socio-cultural contexts in which Indian youth culture is developing is fundamentally different from those in the West.

Conclusion
Music is affect, interaction and cultural knowledge. Music structures the social. Global youth in Bangalore identify with the stylism, energy, freedom, eroticism and glamour of Western media culture and leisure activities. To them, Western pop and video signify a "there" where life's more fun for the young. Simon Frith:

Music constructs our sense of identity through the direct experience it offers of the body, time and sociability, experiences which enable us to place ourselves in imaginative cultural narratives. ... [W]hat makes music special - what makes it special for identity - is that it defines a space without boundaries (a game without frontiers). Music is thus the cultural form best able to cross borders - sounds carry across fences and walls and oceans, across classes, races and nations - and to define places: in clubs, scenes, and raves, listening on headphones, radio and in the concert hall, we are only where the music takes us (124-125).

If global youth identify with/through Western popular music, they disidentify with Indian musical forms. Indian classical music, regional folk musics, religious music and, above all, Hindi film music are found to be archaic, annoying or insipid. On the other hand, neo-ethnic revivals in rock and hybrid genres like the new Hindi pop and London-based bhangramuffin are effortlessly distinguished from the "real thing".

The everyday practice around the reception of Western music culture brings forth spatial divisions. An inside/outside dichotomy is generated, what Ben Malbon terms "spaces of identification" (280). Inside, the circulating meanings of Western youth culture, altered by Indian gatekeepers and interpretations. Inside there is an imaginative connection to elsewhere, there is lived occidentalism (Carrier). Outside, the local others: parents, puritans, politicians, officials, intellectuals. Outside there are also the poor, who lack the various kinds of capital to globalize (cf. Bourdieu). For all these outsiders, global youth culture is something strange, ostentatious, provocative or even threatening (Nandy 70-76).

From music to space to identity. Inside the subcultural places, which represent "gaps" in the Indian cultural hegemony, global tastes and lifestyles are developing. New otherness and new distinctions are emanating in the city. Young cosmopolitans appropriate import culture to coin difference with what has lost legitimacy: state, schooling, religion, history (cf. Hannerz). Western pop music and culturally related video, fashion, cinema, advertising and shopping are perceived to be miles apart from the local nuisance, from Third World India.

Every distinction requires an essentialization of both terms (Carrier 4). Global youth essentialize India (or rather one part of India) as being backward, ugly and hopeless, like they essentialize the West as being dynamic, efficient and tasteful. Cultural identity is cultural identification; their feeling of belonging evolves between the socialization of the elders and the negation of this through the identification with Western media culture. Because of the globalization of economy, technology and culture, space and identity are progressively detached from place, become more and more reflexive (Thompson 173-178).

What makes youth culture in Bangalore different from youth culture in, say, London, is the far more pronounced social inequality. Multinational capitalism brings little solace for the persistent urban problems in India. In Bangalore, a cosmopolitan way of life, like in colonial times, is mainly a privilege for the elites. Someone of the lower middleclass can no doubt listen to Madonna, wear fake jeans, and eat hamburgers, i.e. he may also be the cause and effect of globalization (not to speak of the conservative intellectual who despises this). But he can't afford a party for his friends in the Holiday Inn.

Globalization isn't an even phenomenon, and influences social groups in different ways. There is a "power geometry", according to Doreen Massey (61-62). Moreover, Sarah Thornton (98-105) shows that there are status differences within youth cultures too. These remarks enable us not only to look at globalization and youth culture more critically than is often the case, but also to add nuance to the dividing line between "global youth" and "local others" (Saldanha, 1997). Rich urban adolescents aren't the only consumers of Western pop music in India; there are many global youngsters who enjoy Hindi pop in a carnivalesque way; there are parents who listen to Dire Straits; there certainly are a few grungers amongst the higher classes; demographic factors such as gender, religion, family situation, migration background and residence are very determining; and comparatively speaking, Indian youths are more traditional than their peers in the West.

Articulation of power relations and cultural hierarchy is more complex, more multi-level and more reciprocal than either Bourdieu or Fiske would admit. Androcentrism, patriotism, and family ethics can be severely "translated" through going out, while the Indian class hegemony and the global hegemony of Western pop music remain intact. In India, the consumption of Western pop music (curiously, popular culture in the West) accentuates the economic, social and cultural capital of rich young people. Their
music consumption spatializes social difference. To say it with Lefebvre’s words: they are the ones who can fully claim their droit à la ville.

**Note**

These revised participant observations are part of the larger project of a University Graduate dissertation (Saldanha, 1997). In this study, conducted August-November 1996, I discussed the emergence of the hybrid identity of global youth in Bangalore, India. "Global youth" distanitate themselves from local others, i.e. those who wish or must remain "Indian".

The adjective ‘global’ is derived from the noun ‘globalization’. ‘Global identity’ does therefore not refer to ‘world citizen’, but to identities that develop through the interaction between the tradition of a place and the cross-cultural flows of objects, meanings, values, and people. Global identity stands ‘above’ the local; it is ‘supra-local’, or ‘inter-local’. Hannerz makes a similar distinction between cosmopolitans and locals.

For my research, I relied on field study, informal conversations, and qualitative in-depth interviews of 14 youths, mostly in focus groups. My methodological approach was "psychocultural": I considered social meaning both in terms of practice, power relations and everyday life, and in terms of experience, "mental mapping" and reflexivity. Primarily because of this approach, I could not conclude that "cultural imperialism" was at work in Bangalore (see Thompson 164-173).

**References**


(c) Arun Saldanha 1998